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Legal Origins and the Tasks of Corporate Law in 
Economic Development: A Preliminary Exploration 
John Ohnesorge 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Legal Origins approach, and the wealth of literature it has 
spawned, is surely good for something other than generating more 
literature (for which it clearly is very good). The approach has 
garnered a great deal of criticism,1 but it has nonetheless raised very 
interesting issues about relationships between legal systems, business 
forms, and economic performance. It has also raised a challenge to 
traditional comparative law, a field that has been a bit staid and 
introverted.2 In its favor, Legal Origins also takes methodology 
seriously, which is unfortunately too rare in traditional legal 
scholarship. The approach’s attention to social science methodology 
suggests that it also aspires to advance the state of our knowledge 
about the world, but as other papers in the symposium point out in 
one way or another, there are problems with understanding the 
Legal Origins literature as a scientific breakthrough.3 
Whether or not Legal Origins scholarship actually constitutes 
scientific progress, it may still be very important if it influences the 
real world of law, policy, and economic activity. As will be discussed 
in more detail below, developing countries do not select their 
economic policies and financial legal regimes in a vacuum, but rather 
are often pressured to adopt policies and legal institutions advocated 
 
   Associate Professor and Director, East Asian Legal Studies Center, University of 
Wisconsin Law School. J.D., University of Minnesota Law School (1989); S.J.D., Harvard 
Law School (2002). The author wishes to thank Gordon Smith and the Brigham University 
Law School, as well as the members of the BYU Law Review, for hosting the symposium for 
which this paper was written. In addition, the author wishes to thank Darian Ibrahim for 
thoughtful comments. 
 1. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe & Jordan I. Siegel, Finance and Politics: A Review Essay Based 
on Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus, 47 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 781 (2009) (summarizing existing criticisms and suggesting an alternative 
analytic approach).  
 2. John K.M. Ohnesorge, China’s Economic Transition and the New Legal Origins 
Literature, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 485 (2003). 
 3. See Holger, Spamann, and Simon Deakin in this issue. 
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by developed countries and international institutions. Given that one 
application of the Legal Origins theory is to advance economic and 
legal policy objectives for developing economies, the potential for 
Legal Origins to influence policy directives of these global 
institutions is substantial. 
It is therefore important for those interested in law and 
development4 to pay attention to the fate of Legal Origins as a 
scholarly enterprise, and as an inspiration for policy. Corporations 
and other business entities are so obviously important to economic 
life that one might assume that comparative corporate law would 
long ago have been a point of interest for scholarship on law and 
economic development. Unfortunately, by and large this has not 
been the case. To date, the main focus of comparative corporate 
governance scholarship has been limited to comparisons between the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Japan,5 
while traditional law and economic development literature has had 
little focus on the law of business organizations. If Legal Origins 
scholarship is misguided, however, its ill effects will not be felt in the 
developed countries that are the main focus of comparative corporate 
law scholarship, because the corporate governance regimes of such 
countries tend to continue on their path-dependent ways unless 
domestic interests—not a group of foreign economists—align to 
shake them up.6 Rather, it will be developing and transition 
countries, influenced as they are by the policy prescriptions of aid 
agencies and international financial institutions, that could bear the 
costs. 
This paper offers a preliminary roadmap for interrogating the 
Legal Origins school. Before focusing on Legal Origins, however, 
Part II will address a basic issue facing development efforts: the 
contractual and ideological restriction of policy choices available for 
the development of economic and legal systems. Part III then 
demonstrates how Legal Origins theory influences, and has the 
potential to further influence, the actual development of policy 
choices in international development. Given the actual and potential 
impact of Legal Origins theory on policy choice availability, Part IV 
 
 4. “Law and development” refers to efforts to assist legal system development in 
developing countries, as well as to scholarship analyzing and evaluating such efforts. 
 5. See, e.g., REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 3 (2003). 
 6. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW & CAPITALISM 47–67 (2008). 
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then examines specific concerns raised by Legal Origins, and a 
common theme in this section will be how corporate law functioned 
in successful developing economies in Northeast Asia, as compared 
to the claims of Legal Origins and the development policy 
prescriptions that have followed. There may always be room for 
methodological debate with respect to how advocates of a general 
theory such as Legal Origins should deal with particular cases that do 
not seem to fit the general model, but for questions of economic 
development policy East Asia’s exceptional development 
performance suggests that a general theory ought to be able to 
explain the East Asian experience. 
II. LEGAL ORIGINS AND THE ISSUE OF POLICY SPACE FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
In the economic development literature one sees a great deal of 
concern over “shrinking policy space” for development: that is, in 
recent years developing countries have enjoyed less and less freedom 
to craft and implement their own measures to cope with the 
challenges of development.7 According to this view, developing 
countries have increasingly been under external pressure to adopt 
specific policy measures. Such pressure can come directly, through 
international legal obligations or the conditions imposed by 
international organizations, but it can also come indirectly, through 
the power of ideas and the professional training of policy experts. 
Those who oppose this trend commonly target the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)8 because the discipline imposed by the 
precursor General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime 
left far more room for national governments to pursue individual 
development strategies.9 Although the WTO regime is responsible 
 
 7. See, e.g., Kevin P. Gallagher, Globalization and the Nation-State: Reasserting Policy 
Autonomy for Development, in PUTTING DEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICY 
SPACE IN THE WTO AND IFIS 1 (Kevin P. Gallagher ed., 2005); Robert H. Wade, What 
Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the 
Shrinking of ‘Development Space,’ 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 621 (2003). 
 8. See, e.g., Alisa DiCaprio & Kevin P. Gallagher, The WTO and the Shrinking of 
Development Space: How Big Is the Bite?, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 781 (2006). 
 9. This was true for at least two reasons. First, the GATT disciplines applied primarily 
to the flow of goods across borders, and to issues such as government subsidies, or to 
dumping, which affected trade in goods. The WTO was designed to provide discipline over a 
far broader range of policy issues, ranging from the regulation of foreign direct investment (the 
TRIMS agreement), to trade in services (the GATS agreement), to the protection of 
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for some of the most obvious constraints on developing country 
policies, those constraints are treaty-based, contractual obligations, 
entered into by sovereign governments seeking the benefits of 
membership in the global trade regime. In that sense, the constraints 
of the WTO regime are similar to constraints imposed through 
conditionalities attached to aid received from the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), two other oft-cited sources of 
policy space constraint. To their defenders, on the other hand, the 
World Bank and the IMF can be analogized to commercial lenders, 
with the reforms they demand from developing countries being the 
equivalent of protective terms or conditions demanded by the lender 
in exchange for a loan. 
Second, policy space can also be constrained less contractually, 
through the training and belief systems of those who supply 
development assistance, especially when they correspond to the 
training and belief systems of those receiving that assistance. 
Orthodoxies develop in fields like development economics, and such 
orthodoxies shape the policies of the development assistance 
providers, as well as the policy imaginations of those in developing 
countries.10 Although influence of this type is harder to demonstrate 
than a WTO obligation or an IMF or World Bank conditionality, 
there is little doubt that changing ideas in development economics 
have affected both the activities of the development assistance 
providers, and the activities of developing country policy-makers.11 
Externally-imposed policy constraints might be explained as just 
a cost to be borne in order to enjoy some benefit, such as 
participation in the global trading regime. In that case the imposed 
policies need not be benefits in and of themselves to the constrained 
country to be justified; they just have to impose costs that are less 
 
intellectual property (the TRIPS agreement). See id. at 785–93. A second important way in 
which the WTO tightens the disciplinary reins as compared with the GATT is through the 
judicialization of the dispute settlement system, and the fact that countries no longer have the 
legal right to block decisions that go against them. Id. at 794. 
 10. John K.M. Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theories: Law and Development 
Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 221–22 
(2006); Alice Amsden, The Spectre of Anglo-Saxonization Is Haunting South Korea, in KOREA 
POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 87 (L-J Cho & Kim YH eds., 1994) 
(describing the role of American-trained Korean economists in Korea’s shift away from 
German and Japanese models of economic governance toward an Anglo-Saxon model). 
 11. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
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than the more general benefits of participating in the regime. Such 
policy constraints are often not presented as simple costs, however; 
they are usually presented as benefits in and of themselves. The 
additional constraints imposed by the WTO over the GATT regime 
provided a good case in point of this treatment. Proponents of the 
constraints imposed by the TRIPS agreement on national intellectual 
property regimes defend them on the basis that improved intellectual 
property protection will benefit the target country by encouraging 
investment in research and development and innovation—in addition 
to benefitting other WTO members. The TRIMS agreement—
constraining countries’ ability to impose restrictions on foreign direct 
investment—can be seen in the same way. In this sense, the 
constraints can be seen as helping the developing country do what 
was in its own interest, but which it could not accomplish for some 
reason such as the influence of domestic interest groups. 
Whether policy constraints are presented as actually benefiting 
the constrained countries, or understood as costs that must be borne 
to achieve an offsetting good, such judgments should be based on 
evidence. By definition, constraints on policy choice are designed to 
take options off the table, to force a level of convergence in 
economic governance. But the idea of forcing convergence in 
governance tends to assume both a great deal of knowledge about 
the interaction of law and economic activity, and that the needs of all 
economies with respect to economic regulation are essentially the 
same. Knowledge about interactions between legal institutions and 
real economic activity would be necessary in order to decide which 
legal rules or institutions would produce the desired social end, even 
if the end itself were not in dispute. Economies at different stages of 
development, or pursuing different development strategies, have 
often pursued different ends with respect to economic governance, 
however,12 so we should be attuned to the fact that seemingly 
technical convergence initiatives may have a homogenizing effect on 
development strategies. 
The Legal Origins approach to comparative corporate law could 
potentially affect the policy space available to developing countries in 
both these ways, by informing the design of binding international 
obligations or of demands made by assistance providers, and also by 
 
 12. For a discussion of “varieties of capitalism” literature, see infra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
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affecting the way policy makers understand and argue about the tasks 
of corporate law in developing economies. This paper therefore 
treats Legal Origins as informing both “contractual” and ideological 
constraints on the range of choices available to developing countries 
in the corporate law realm, and raises a set of concerns about that 
prospect. As will be discussed in Part IV below, these concerns are 
driven at least in part by the history of economic development in 
Northeast Asia, and the role of corporations and corporate law 
therein.13 
III. LEGAL ORIGINS AND THE WORLD BANK’S DOING BUSINESS 
PROJECT 
To understand the interaction between law and finance and law 
and development, it is crucial to focus on the Doing Business project 
of the World Bank.14 One might ask whether it makes sense to focus 
on the Doing Business project since it is only one unit within the 
World Bank involved in law reform work, and many of those 
working in the Bank hold diverse views on development issues.15 
Nonetheless, there is no other unit within the Bank speaking so 
publicly and clearly on corporate law and economic development, so 
it seems fair to hold the Bank to the views expressed by the Doing 
Business group, even if there are alternative voices within the Bank.16 
In addition, while institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Union, and the United States government have 
also been involved in corporate law reform efforts, it seems that the 
Doing Business project offers the most important single statement by 
 
 13. See Ohnesorge, supra note 10, at 224 (arguing that to the extent that law and 
development orthodoxies “cannot accommodate the Northeast Asian experience . . . they are 
deeply inadequate”). 
 14. See generally The World Bank Group, Doing Business, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2010); The World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group, Doing Business: An Independent Evaluation (2008) (reporting results of a 
review of Doing Business by the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group); Alvaro Santos, 
Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43 (2009) 
(discussing the Doing Business project and its effects on labor market policies in developing 
countries). 
 15. See TERRY HALLIDAY & BRUCE CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING 
AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) (voicing skepticism over the usefulness of studying 
the pronouncements of international financial institutions such as the World Bank). 
 16. In an otherwise fairly critical review, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation 
Group describes Doing Business as “one of the Bank Group’s flagship knowledge products.”  
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, supra note 14, at xiii. 
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any development institution on the relationship between corporate 
law and economic development. Before examining what Doing 
Business has to say about corporate law specifically, an overview of 
the project will help put the corporate law portions in context. 
The general spirit of the Doing Business project draws heavily on 
the work of Hernando de Soto, who famously chronicled and 
criticized the formalities required to legally form and operate a 
business in Peru,17 combined with what has been described as the 
“league tables” approach to cross-national comparison.18 The Doing 
Business group gathers information from around the world in order 
to rank countries according to eleven different criteria, with most of 
the criteria designed to get at issues highlighted by de Soto, such as 
the steps required to register a legal business. The connection to 
Legal Origins comes through the investor protection portion within 
the larger project, which is tied very directly to the Law and Finance 
school.19 
Stripped of its technical overlay, the Legal Origins message on 
corporate law and economic development, propagated via Doing 
Business, is straightforward. Private-led development is best, an 
assumption that has been dominant since more statist development 
approaches of the 1950s and 1960s were abandoned decades ago.20 
Private-led development depends upon financial markets to allocate 
capital, a rejection of the bank-centered financial systems chronicled 
in the “varieties of capitalism” literature,21 and a very clear rejection 
of the idea of allocating capital to industry through specialized 
development banks, as had been popular in the 1960s. Deep, liquid 
(“developed”) financial markets depend upon vigorous protections 
for minority shareholders, who provide capital but lack the voting 
power to protect their investments, and therefore the main focus of 
 
 17. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989) (especially Chapter 5: The Costs 
and Importance of the Law). For an early critique of de Soto based on the Asian development 
experience, see Frank K. Upham, Speculations on Legal Informality, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 233 
(1994). 
 18. See WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 152–68 (2000) 
(discussing the creation of “league tables” for national legal systems as an example of mental 
mapping). 
 19. See generally World Bank Group, Protecting Investors, http://www.doing 
business.org/ExploreTopics/ProtectingInvestors/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2010). 
 20. See generally JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 128–57 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing “developmentalist” approaches to economic 
development in the 1950s and 1960s). 
 21. See infra note 27. 
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corporate law reform for economic development should be the legal 
protection of shareholders’ rights. Since controlling shareholders’ 
interests are protected by majority voting provisions typically found 
in corporate law, the focus turns to legal protection for minority 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders actually tend to become the 
villains of the story, as it is their rapaciousness that the law must 
control, so minority shareholder rights come to the fore as the 
primary focus of corporate law reform. 
Legal Origins began in academe, and while the world of 
scholarship clearly influences development assistance policies,22 such 
influence is usually too slow, indirect, and diffuse to easily trace—let 
alone to provoke a real political battle. Legal Origins may prove an 
exception to that general rule. As noted above, the most apparent 
conduit through which Legal Origins scholarship exerts influence in 
the world of development assistance is through the World Bank’s 
Doing Business project, which ranks countries according to many 
criteria, including “investor protection,”23 an indicator that draws 
directly from Legal Origins scholarship. While this may seem like an 
unimportant use of already arcane scholarship, the Doing Business 
project’s championing of labor market flexibility over workers’ rights 
in its “Employing Workers” index,24 as well as its stance on specific 
tax issues, led the U.S. Congress to target Doing Business in an 
appropriations bill provision somewhat bluntly entitled “Reform of 
the ‘Doing Business’ Report of the World Bank.”25 World Bank 
 
 22. Trubek & Santos, supra note 11. 
 23. Doing Business, World Bank Group, Protecting Investors, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/ProtectingInvestors/ (last visited Jan. 14, 
2010).  
 24. See Santos, supra note 14, at 64. 
 25. The full text of § 1626(a) reads: 
Sec. 1626.  Reform of the ‘Doing Business’ Report of the World Bank 
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive 
Directors at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
International Development Association, and the International Finance Corporation 
of the following United States policy goals, and to use the voice and vote of the 
United States to actively promote and work to achieve these goals: 
 (1) Suspension of the use of the ‘Employing Workers’ Indicator for the 
purpose of ranking or scoring country performance in the annual Doing 
Business Report of the World Bank until a set of indicators can be devised that 
fairly represent the value of internationally recognized workers’ rights, 
including core labor standards, in creating a stable and favorable environment 
for attracting private investment. The indicators shall bring to bear the 
experiences of the member governments in dealing with the economic, social 
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leadership claims to have responded by notifying staff that “the 
[Employing Workers Indicator] does not represent World Bank 
policy and should not be used as a basis for policy advice or in any 
country program documents that outline or evaluate the 
development strategy or assistance program for a recipient 
country.”26 The Legal Origins-inspired “investor protection” 
indicator was not targeted in the same way, but the episode 
demonstrates that the real world can take notice when scholarship 
becomes tied directly to controversial policy reform agendas, as is 
arguably the case with Legal Origins and the Doing Business project. 
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCERNS 
Having outlined the importance of the Legal Origins approach 
for those interested in law and economic development, the following 
sections raise a set of concerns about the use of Legal Origins to 
inform corporate law reform for developing countries. As noted 
above, most of these concerns are driven in one way or another by 
the history of economic development in East Asia. One set of 
concerns relates to methodology, and the way in which hypotheses 
are formed and tested. Other concerns relate to effects Legal Origins 
 
and political complexity of labor market issues. The indicators should be 
developed through collaborative discussions with and between the World 
Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International Labor 
Organization, private companies,  and labor unions. 
 (2) Elimination of the ‘Labor Tax and Social Contributions’  Subindicator 
from the annual Doing Business Report of the World Bank. 
 (3) Removal of the ‘Employing Workers’ Indicator as a ‘guidepost’ for 
calculating the annual Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score for 
each recipient country. 
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–32, § 1110, 123 Stat. 1902 
(amending 22 U.S.C. § 262p). The attempt by Congress to reign in the Doing Business 
Group received some publicity, but it appears that this was primarily because President Obama 
used a signing statement to signal that he saw this as Congressional interference in his conduct 
of foreign affairs. Charlie Savage, Obama’s Embrace of a Bush Tactic Riles Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/ 
us/politics/09signing.html. To access President Obama’s signing statement online, see Press 
Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement from the President upon Signing 
H.R. 2346 (June 24, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Statement-from-the-President-upon-signing-HR-2346/. 
 26. Press Release, Bank Info. Ctr., Frank Praises Changes to World Bank “Doing 
Business” Report (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://www.bicusa.org/en/ 
Article.11123.aspx. 
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may have on basic understandings of law, capitalism, and 
entrepreneurial spirit. 
A. Methodology 
One concern is a basic methodological point about how theory is 
generated. An initial hypothesis ought to be tested against data. If 
the data does not confirm the hypothesis, then the hypothesis ought 
to be refined or discarded. There is plenty of literature criticizing 
Legal Origins in terms of data and methodology, but my concern is 
more with the way in which the initial hypotheses were developed. It 
appears that the hypotheses may have been developed in a mood of 
“irrational exuberance” over Anglo-American economic ascendance, 
and by people committed to a particularly free-market vision of 
capitalism. There is nothing surprising about this blending of 
scholarship with political preferences, as this kind of scholarship is 
inherently political in a way that real science is not. The issue, 
though, is that when forming hypotheses about law and successful 
corporate development, there is no justification for not considering a 
range of successful episodes of capitalist development when 
formulating the hypotheses. There is an enormous literature on 
varieties of capitalism, and this literature has long explored questions 
that would seem central to Legal Origins, such as the role of the 
state in economic governance.27 It would seem that this literature 
would be a natural source of insights, but it seems largely absent 
from the bibliographies of the Legal Origins school.28 Engaging 
more with this existing literature could have highlighted a set of 
issues that are implicated by the choice of corporate law rules and 
institutions, and would also have highlighted the fact that successful 
market economy legal systems differ along these issues. 
For example, it has long been noted that economies differ with 
respect to the “patience” of capital. Japan and Germany are often 
 
 27. See, e.g., PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE 
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES (1986); NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND 
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996); THE END OF DIVERSITY? 
PROSPECTS FOR GERMAN AND JAPANESE CAPITALISM (Kozo Yamamura & Wolfgang Streeck 
eds., 2003); THE ORIGINS OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM: GERMANY AND JAPAN IN 
COMPARISON (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David 
Soskice eds., 2001). 
 28. See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 6. 
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noted for long-term, stable relationships between investors and 
management, while the United States in particular has been cited as 
an economy in which investors are much more concerned with 
short-term returns.29 In the 1980s, when Americans were searching 
for explanations for the ascendance of Japanese industry, the 
“patience” of Japanese investors was cited as an advantage because it 
allowed Japan’s corporate managers to adopt longer time horizons 
than their U.S. competitors, who had to focus more intently on 
stock prices and footloose investors.30 Whether or not this 
comparison was accurate in the 1980s, it highlights an important 
issue for corporate law design: the trade-off between encouraging 
management to focus on investors and giving management the 
freedom to adopt long-term strategies and to take risks. If we 
envision this trade-off as a spectrum, Legal Origins seems strongly 
biased toward what could be called the Anglo-Saxon view, in which 
management is supposed to focus on returns to shareholders and is 
biased against greater management autonomy. This view goes hand 
in hand with the preference for market-centered over bank-centered 
finance, and is reflected in the method’s obsession with minority 
shareholder protection. This makes sense if the central problem for 
corporate law to address is managerial opportunism and the agency 
slack that can exist between shareholders and management, or 
controlling shareholders. 
If the Legal Origins scholars had started their inquiry into 
corporate law and economic performance more empirically and 
inductively, by looking at successful economic development episodes 
and then asking what kind of corporate law had been in place, they 
would almost certainly have looked at countries in Northeast Asia. 
These countries provide the best modern examples of long-term 
economic growth where private corporations played a central role. 
Even cursory attention to Northeast Asia would have revealed highly 
successful corporate-led growth in civil law countries, a serious 
challenge to prescriptive uses of Legal Origins, though to add to the 
complexity it is fairly clear that local economic, social, and political 
 
 29. See Sigurt Vitols, From Banks to Markets: The Political Economy of Liberalization of 
the German and Japanese Financial Systems, in THE END OF DIVERSITY? PROSPECTS FOR 
GERMAN AND JAPANESE CAPITALISM, supra note 27, at 240. 
 30. See, e.g., Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura, Introduction: Convergence or 
Diversity? Stability and Change in German and Japanese Capitalism, in THE END OF 
DIVERSITY? PROSPECTS FOR GERMAN AND JAPANESE CAPITALISM, supra note 27, at 1–2. 
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conditions greatly influenced the way imported civil law forms 
actually functioned in Northeast Asia. Looking at successful 
corporations in Taiwan and Korea would have revealed founding, 
controlling shareholders firmly in charge in the vast majority of 
successful corporations, though using different methods to construct 
corporate groups.31 Minority shareholder rights were weakly 
protected in law, but small investors who bought the floated shares 
in such corporations surely did not expect to be able to use the law 
to enforce their rights, and were instead playing the market in ways 
that did not matter much to the controlling shareholders because 
corporations had other sources of capital. Japan’s corporate 
organization was quite different during its high-growth decades, 
with little family control of major corporations. Instead, banks and 
insurance companies provided the relatively stable, large 
shareholding that allowed management freedom to engage in long-
term planning and investment, and to take risks that they might not 
have taken if they were worried about lawsuits by minority 
shareholders.32 
B. Worse than Just Mistaken? 
A second concern with Legal Origins is that this approach over-
emphasizes corporate law at the expense of other variables that could 
be much more important for economic activity, especially to 
developing countries.33 In doing so, Legal Origins thinking may be 
more than just mistaken, but actually harmful and misleading. It 
would seem that for a developing country with few successful 
corporations, the major tasks of corporate law would be to 
encourage entrepreneurs to invest their own capital in productive 
 
 31. The classic chaebol form in Korea involves founding family control of corporate 
groups through interlocked shareholding of related companies. See Myeong-Hyeon Cho, 
Reform of Corporate Governance, in ECONOMIC CRISIS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN 
KOREA 286, 286 (Stephan Haggard, Wonhyuk Lim & Euysung Kim eds., 2003). The classic 
depiction of Taiwan’s private business groups focused on family ties, rather than cross-
shareholding, to hold groups together. See Susan Greenhalgh, Families and Networks in 
Taiwan’s Economic Development, in CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF TAIWAN 224, 224 (Edwin A. Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh eds., 1988). 
 32. MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 6, at 90–91. 
 33. One explanatory variable that common sense would suggest might be more 
important than corporate law or some other institutional factor would be a government’s 
actual policy choices. On this point, see Peter Blair Henry & Conrad Miller, Institutions vs. 
Policies: A Tale of Two Islands (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14604, 2008), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14604. 
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enterprises, to help them attract early-stage capital from outside 
investors as necessary, and to give them the incentives and the 
flexibility that would allow them to take the large risks that they will 
face as they try to capture markets and to grow. This is particularly 
true when the goal is export-led growth, in which products must 
compete on international markets, the competition will be fierce, and 
risk-taking and flexibility will be at a premium. None of these tasks is 
closely related to the strength of minority shareholder protections in 
corporate law, the central concern of Legal Origins.34 Limited 
liability is probably crucial, but early private equity investors, like 
creditors, can protect themselves through contract rather than 
statutory corporate law protections. As for the incentive structure 
and the flexibility necessary to build a substantial corporation, both 
of these may well be in conflict with highly developed legal 
protections for minority shareholders. If the South Korean corporate 
law of the 1960s and 1970s was subjected to a law-in-action 
application of the Director Liability Index, the Shareholder Suits 
Index, and the other indices that make up the Investor Protection 
Index, it would have failed miserably. But whatever corporate law 
did do in rapidly developing Korea was obviously sufficient to 
facilitate entrepreneurship, capital accumulation, and risk-taking, 
which was clearly sufficient for high-speed development. What 
corporate law did not do very effectively was constrain majority 
shareholders for the protection of minority shareholders, but that 
seems like a secondary or intermediate task of corporate law in 
developing countries, not the primary task, unless one assumes that 
external equity finance is crucial, which the historical success of 
bank-centered financial systems in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere 
has shown is not correct.35 
A related concern is that the Legal Origins tradition focuses on 
the intermediary condition, the legal system, and corporate law, 
rather than on the actual substantive goal which law should serve. 
This is common in attempts to achieve particular societal results via 
general institutional reforms, but it is nevertheless problematic. Even 
if left unstated, ultimate social goals are often encoded into the 
approach that is chosen. For example, a decision to focus on 
minority shareholder protection is based on a view about what kind 
 
 34. See Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theories, supra note 10, at 252. 
 35. See “varieties of capitalism” discussion supra Part IV.A. 
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of corporation is the ultimate end, while the ultimate end may not 
be subject to the debate that it deserves. In the Legal Origins 
tradition the intermediate objective for corporate law seems to be 
developed equity markets as a source of external finance, while the 
link between external finance and successful corporations receives 
much less attention. The assumption is that finance through the 
equity markets will be important for developing a successful 
corporate sector, but data from a country like South Korea during 
rapid development would call that into question. The traditional 
account is that the Korean chaebol were financed primarily by bank 
lending and by retained earnings, rather than through the equity 
markets, and the government played a role in guiding the allocation 
of capital from the banks.36 It is undisputed that this system worked 
well enough for world-class corporations such as Samsung, Hyundai, 
and LG to develop essentially from nothing. 
The Korean government’s rationing of credit during the decades 
of rapid growth raises the issue of government failure, as it should. It 
reflected older approaches to development economics that saw 
market failure everywhere in developing economies, and did not 
worry too much about the prospect of government failure.37 In its 
focus on equity markets as the source of capital, Legal Origins may 
have moved too far in the opposite direction, focusing too heavily on 
market solutions to the challenges of development. It is theoretically 
possible that if the proper framework of corporate law is put in place, 
corporate development will take care of itself, avoiding the risk of 
government failure, but modern history is not filled with examples of 
this. Rather, Legal Origins tends to make necessity out of virtue, 
which may create very misleading ideas about how law and capitalism 
interact in the real world. Abuse of dispersed shareholders by 
unaccountable management in a Berle-Means corporation38 is bad, 
just as abuse of minority shareholders by unaccountable chaebol 
chairmen is bad. Effective legal protections for small shareholders are 
 
 36. JUNG-EN WOO, RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND FINANCE IN KOREAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION (1991). 
 37. See generally JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 128–57 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing “developmentalist” approaches to economic 
development in the 1950s and 1960s). 
 38. “Berle-Means corporation” refers to a publicly traded corporation, the governance 
of which is characterized by a separation of ownership from control due to the inability of 
dispersed shareholders to effectively control management. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER 
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 78–84 (1991). 
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good, as are efficient, well-functioning financial markets. The danger 
to clear analysis is to confuse what is good with what is necessary, 
and this is one of the real shortcomings of Legal Origins. 
A final concern is that the Legal Origins approach contributes to 
a basic misunderstanding of entrepreneurship, and the drive to create 
businesses, that is the real driving force behind private-led economic 
development. In describing American law in the nineteenth century, 
the great legal historian Willard Hurst spoke of the law’s role in the 
“release of energy” that was necessary to settle the country and 
develop the private economy.39 In Hurst’s words, “The substance of 
what business wanted from law was the provision for ordinary use of 
an organization through which entrepreneurs could better mobilize 
and release economic energy.”40 Entrepreneurs wanted from the law 
an “orderly capital subscription procedure under which capital could 
be fed into the enterprise,” they wanted limited liability, and they 
wanted “a form of organization which firmly and broadly delegated 
power over mobilized capital to managers and directors.”41 
“[C]apital mobilization and discipline were the heart of the 
matter.”42 Hurst was describing the role of corporate law when 
America was a developing economy, but it is not a bad description of 
the way corporate law functioned in rapidly developing Northeast 
Asia. By contrast, Legal Origins tends to vilify the entrepreneur, such 
as the chaebol chairman, who creates and leads the corporation, but 
without that entrepreneur, there is no business. History, in America 
as well as Northeast Asia, suggests that successful capitalist 
development must leave plenty of room for the play of what Keynes 
called the “animal spirits.” Keynes wrote that “[m]ost, probably, of 
our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of 
which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken 
as a result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather 
than inaction . . . .”43 Corporate law in developing countries must 
play some role in protecting investors from the “animal spirits” of 
founders and controlling shareholders. To that end Legal Origins 
 
 39. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 1–32 (1956). 
 40. Id. at 17. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND 
MONEY 161 (1936). 
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can be helpful. But, at the same time, it must encourage the release 
of entrepreneurial energy without which there will be no growing, 
successful corporations in which minority shareholders can invest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Legal Origins school has raised many interesting questions 
about the role of corporate law in economies around the world, and 
has attempted to provide a rigorous methodology for exploring 
those questions. For that it must be praised, as comparative 
scholarship on law and economic development has not been noted 
for rigorous methodology. On the other hand, given that the real-
world influence of Legal Origins at the World Bank and elsewhere 
appears to have outstripped the approach’s intellectual foundations, 
it is important to raise serious questions about its methodology, its 
assumptions, and its effects. This paper offers a preliminary roadmap 
for interrogating the Legal Origins school, looking in part at how 
corporate law functioned in successful developing economies in 
Northeast Asia, and matching that against the Legal Origins 
prescriptions. If they do not match up, something ought to give, and 
it really should be the theory. 
